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ON TARSKI’S FOUNDATIONS OF THE GEOMETRY OF SOLIDS
ARIANNA BETTI AND IRIS LOEB
Abstract. The paper [Tarski:Les fondements de la ge´ome´trie des corps,Annales de la Socie´te´
Polonaise de Mathe´matiques, pp. 29–34, 1929] is in many ways remarkable. We address three
historico-philosophical issues that force themselves upon the reader. First we argue that in
this paper Tarski did not live up to his own methodological ideals, but displayed instead a
much more pragmatic approach. Second we show that Les´niewski’s philosophy and systems
do not play the signiﬁcant role that one may be tempted to assign to them at ﬁrst glance.
Especially the role of background logic must be at least partially allocated to Russell’s systems
of Principia mathematica. This analysis leads us, third, to a threefold distinction of the
technical ways in which the domain of discourse comes to be embodied in a theory. Having
all of this in place, we discuss why we have to reject the argument in [Gruszczyn´ski and
Pietruszczak: Full development of Tarski’s Geometry of Solids, The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic,
vol. 4 (2008), no. 4, pp. 481–540] according to which Tarski has made a certain mistake.
§1. Introduction. Tarski’s geometrical work in the late twenties has re-
cently become a subject of general interest for historians of mathematics
and axiomatics ([Givant, 1999], p. 50; [Tarski and Givant, 1999], p. 192;
[Marchisotto and Smith, 2007], p. 350; [Smith, 2010], p. 483), who have
stressed one of its important methodological aspects, namely Tarski’s ex-
press dislike for formulating axioms with the use of deﬁned notions. This
aspect is generally portrayed, both by Tarski and other scholars, as dis-
tinctive of his approach to axiomatics with respect to the historical context
formed by the work of people such as Hilbert, Pieri and Huntington.
However, an early, rather sketchy paper by Tarski [Tarski, 1929] which
oﬀers an axiomatisation of the so-called geometry of solids—and of which
[Gruszczyn´ski andPietruszczak, 2008] oﬀers a “full development”—presents
methodological oddities that contrast strikingly with this picture. The orig-
inal 1929 French paper uses deﬁned notions in the axioms. Besides, the
additions made by Tarski to the English translation of the paper in 1956
[Tarski, 1956a], far from removing the methodological oddities, make for
even more puzzlement: more axioms are added with deﬁned notions and
Tarski proposes a “convenient” variant of the system including a strictly
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speaking superﬂuous primitive notion which would make the primitive no-
tions of the system interdeﬁnable (i.e., dependent). Letters kept in the
Woodger Papers at the Special Collections Library of UCL show no indica-
tion that at the time of the translation, done by Joseph Henry Woodger and
checked by Tarski, Tarski considered the paper methodologically ﬂawed,
which suggests that the oddities in this respect must be taken at face value.
The methodological oddities in [Tarski, 1929, 1956a] are also striking for
a reason other than discrepancy with Tarski’s own, self-professed method-
ological convictions, albeit a related one. At ﬁrst glance, the deductive
basis of Tarski’s paper seems to be the system of Mereology of Tarski’s
teacher, Les´niewski, and what Mancosu calls “background logic” ([Man-
cosu, 2006], p. 217, n. 9) seems also Les´niewskian. So one might be led to
think that Tarski’s geometry of solids was conceived within a Les´niewskian
framework,1 or even that Tarski’s geometry of solids is what Les´niewski’s
geometry would have looked like had he built one ([Luschei, 1962], p. 318,
n. 80).
But Les´niewski was extremely strict in his methodological convictions.
He never allowed deﬁned notions in axioms. If Tarski really had wanted
to work within Les´niewski’s systems, he should and would have proceeded
in a diﬀerent way. Something similar applies also to the background logic
and the mereological basis of [Tarski, 1929, 1956a]. If the latter were really
Les´niewskian, the paper would have looked considerably diﬀerent.
In this paper we address both the issues of Tarski’s (not) practicing what
he preaches in [Tarski, 1929], and his (not) practicing in particular what
Les´niewski preaches and practices. Tackling these two issues will lead us to
raise a third point: the way in which the notion of domain of discourse of a
science was technically embodied in a formal theory in Tarski’s times.
As to the ﬁrst two issues, we argue that [Tarski, 1929] highlights Tarski’s
pragmatic attitude and his ability to connect various ﬁelds and frameworks
to arrive at interesting mathematical results, rather than that it witnesses
to particular methodological convictions—an analysis that conﬁrms and
strengthens the lines of interpretation oﬀered in [Sinaceur, 2001] and [Betti,
1This is what [Betti, 2008], p. 42 vaguely suggests. Cf. also [Sundholm, 2003], p. 116, who,
speaking of 1929, takes Tarski to be “true to his Les´niewskian calling” and [Mancosu, 2006]
p. 217, n. 10 (“The background system here is Lesniewski’s ontology”), while [Feferman and
Feferman, 2004], p. 102 claim by contrast that after his dissertation in 1923 Tarski “never
worked on those [Les´niewski’s] systems again”. Combining the conclusions of [Betti, 2008]
(see e.g., pp. 48–50, 53) with what we say in this paper we can say that although Tarski
did not stop abruptly working on Les´niewski’s systems after his dissertation, those systems
had no privileged status in Tarski’s work, but were treated either as just one object of study
among other systems, or merely provided isolated notions to be freely used in combination
with other notions from other, possibly quite diﬀerent systems, whenever convenient. As to
[Tarski, 1929] in particular, we shall argue that the second case applies and that the role of
Les´niewski’s systems is marginal.
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2008]. In fact, Tarski’s choices in the 1929 paper are apparently made to the
detriment of such methodological convictions. The use of deﬁned notions in
axioms was anathema for the tradition of Polish axiomatics in which Tarski
was educated, and in particular for Les´niewski, but having deﬁned notions in
axioms is evidently not ofmuch trouble toTarski here. Besides, the deductive
basis of the paper is not Les´niewskian, or at least not any clear-cut way—that
is, Tarski does not really base his foundations on Les´niewski’s Mereology
(which is a non-logical theory) together with the background logic required
by Les´niewski’s Mereology (the two systems of Protothetics and Ontology).
Rather, Tarski is freely lifting notions from Les´niewski’s Mereology and
combining them with those of the system of Principia mathematica. On top
of this he takes notions from topology that are not intrinsic to either of these
systems.
This is relevant to our third issue in an important way. The role that the
system of Whitehead and Russell’s Principia mathematica plays in [Tarski,
1929, 1956a] is not just that of providing Tarski with some notions: its
role seems more prominent. Our conclusion is that only by granting the
type theoretical approach of Principia mathematica a role in the background
logic for this paper can one give a meaningful account to some otherwise
ununiﬁable parts of it. This said, one has to keep in mind that the very
notion of background logic for a paper as sketchy as [Tarski, 1929, 1956a] is
not straightforward. Under the “background logic” or “underlying logic” of
a mathematical paper we understand the precise system of (axiomatic) logic
andderivation rules that have (tacitly) been assumedas the underlying formal
framework for the whole of speciﬁc (non-logical) axioms and deﬁnitions.
The concept of “background” or “underlying logic” (cf. e.g., [Church, 1956],
55., p. 317) may be thus problematic, because it may be the case that the
working mathematician has no particular logical system in mind for her
mathematical results. Instead she could have the conviction that those results
could be formalised in one system or another. And this, wemaintain, applies
at least to some extent to [Tarski, 1929, 1956a].
Our ﬁndings as to the type theoretical approach of this paper are also
relevant for the debate on the correct philosophical interpretation of Tarski’s
notion of logical consequence, a debate famously opened by Etchemendy
[Etchemendy, 1988] and centering on the question of whether in 1936 Tarski
held a variable or a ﬁxed conception of model, and can be seen as further
evidence to [Mancosu, 2006]’s conclusion that Tarski in that period held a
relative ﬁxed-domain conception of model.2 The crucial point in this debate
is the relation between the domain of discourse and the range of quantiﬁers.
We propose to reﬁne Mancosu’s distinction between these two notions by
introducing a diﬀerence in levels between the domain of discourse of a science
in a non-technical sense and the three technical ways in which in Tarski’s
2For a reconstruction of the debate, see [Mancosu, 2010].
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time the notion of domain of discourse could be codiﬁed in a formal theory.
The range of quantiﬁers, we hold, is merely one of these technical ways.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is about Tarski’s work in
geometry during the years 1926–1928 and how his paper on the geometry of
solids does not ﬁt in. We point out three diﬀerences: ﬁrst, the use of Mere-
ology in [Tarski, 1929]; second, its focus on the geometry of solids; third,
and most importantly, its unconcern for methodological principles. The
ﬁrst two are only superﬁcially Les´niewskian because of Tarski’s pragmatical
attitude of using methods and tools from diﬀerent areas and philosophical
approaches, while the third is strongly non-Les´niewskian.
We discuss the Les´niewskian character of the topic—geometry of solids—
in Section 3. Wewill also point out other inﬂuences, like [Whitehead, 1919]’s,
and discuss in what respects Tarski’s speciﬁc approach to the geometry of
solids as atomless stands in the way of classifying the topic of [Tarski, 1929]
once and for all as Les´niewskian.
In Section 4 we discuss brieﬂy the precise mathematical content of Tarski’s
paper, including the speciﬁc way in which the axiom system has been for-
mulated. This joins up with the fact that Tarski used deﬁned notions in
axioms.
Section 5 subsequently deals more thoroughly with the role of Russell’s
system in [Tarski, 1929], which we only touch upon in the forgoing section.
This leads to a discussion of the role and extension of the range of the
quantiﬁers and the domain of discourse in [Tarski, 1929]. Mathematical
arguments show that the extension of the range of the quantiﬁers includes
that of the domain of discourse (“solids”) without being further speciﬁed,
while the extension of the class of (Russellian)“individuals”—objects of the
ﬁrst type—that Tarski assumes should be identiﬁed with the latter.
This leads naturally to a discussion of Tarski’s use of the term “universe
of discourse” in a passage added in [Tarski, 1956a] and of a misconception
in [Gruszczyn´ski and Pietruszczak, 2008] as to how to interpret this passage
in Section 6. We will argue that Tarski’s “universe of discourse” should be
interpreted as the domain of discourse in the way we use it in our paper, and
restate that the domain of discourse and the range of the quantiﬁers cannot
be equated. Furthermore we will argue that the passage in which this notion
appears has been added because in [Tarski, 1929] the domain of discourse
does not get represented by a primitive notion in the theory, by contrast with
the custom of logicians of that time. This leads to a reﬁnement of the picture
sketched in [Mancosu, 2006] as to the way in which the notion of the domain
of a theory was conceptualized at that time.
§2. Tarski’s 1926–1927 work in geometry. Although [Tarski, 1929] was
published in 1929, its content comes from a lecture delivered in 1927 at the
ﬁrst conference of Polish mathematicians, published two years later in the
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volume of Proceedings of that conference. Tarski gives a speciﬁc motivation
for the paper:
Some years ago Mr. Les´niewski suggested the problem of estab-
lishing the foundations of a geometry of solids, understanding by
this terma systemof geometrydestitute of such geometrical ﬁgures
as points, lines and surfaces, and admitting as ﬁgures only solids—
the intuitive correlates of regular open (resp. closed) sets (. . . ) of
three-dimensional Euclidean geometry; the speciﬁc character of
such a geometry of solids—in contrast to each “point” geometry—
is shown in particular in the law according to which each ﬁgure
contains another ﬁgure as a proper part. ([Tarski, 1929] in [Givant
and Mackenzie, 1986a], p. 227) (Our translation)3
It is likely that the “problem posed by Les´niewski some years ago” refers
to a problem that Les´niewski had raised in his course “Foundations of
Three-Dimensional Euclidean Geometry in the Light of the New Theory of
Classes”, 1921–24 ([Surma, Srzednicki, Barnett, and Rickey, 1991]. Vol. 1,
p. 12), which Tarski had followed as a student.4 Notice that “the New
Theory of Classes” occurring in the title of Les´niewski’s course is his theory
of collective classes, i.e., Mereology, a deductive, axiomatic, extensional
theory of parts and wholes. We take it, then, that the problem concerned
how to build geometry on a mereological deductive basis, which is exactly
what Tarski sets out to do.
How seriously should we take the Les´niewskian ﬂavour of Tarski’s paper,
though? It has been suggested that at this time ([Sundholm, 2003], p. 116)
or at least speciﬁcally in this paper in some sense ([Betti, 2008], p. 42) Tarski
was working within Les´niewski’s framework, and Luschei ([Luschei, 1962],
p. 318, n. 80) even refers to the content of the paper as “the geometries of
Lesniewski and Tarski”, but this isn’t convincing for several reasons. The
paper does present two elements that we would qualify as Les´niewskian:
ﬁrst, Tarski’s choice to develop Euclidean geometry starting from solids
rather than from points; and second, his development of solid geometry
from a mereological deductive basis. Both are methodological issues with a
strong ontological motivation. In the terms of Les´niewski’s systems, saying
that the geometry of solids is developed on a deductive mereological basis
means that the system of the geometry of solids presupposes Mereology,
which is a formal, deductive, non-logical theory, which in turn presupposes
Les´niewski’s background logic (i.e., the two systems of Ontology and Pro-
tothetics). By 1927 Tarski, however, was using tools and approaches which
were already quite distant from Les´niewski’s approach ([Betti, 2008], p. 49).
3A regular open set is one that is identical to the interior of its closure. Tarski refers here
to [Kuratowski, 1922]. We will see the latter’s deﬁnition later on.
4Owen LeBlanc, in a correspondence dated October 8, 2011, reports that this conjecture
was conﬁrmed by Les´niewski’s student Czesław Lejewski in conversation.
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As we shall see better in the following section, the Les´niewskian character of
the paper is indeed more superﬁcial than one might think at ﬁrst, and what
is more, decidedly non-Les´niewskian elements are also clearly present. For
the time being however, let us note that from the point of view of both these
allegedly Les´niewskian elements—Mereology and the geometry of solids—
[Tarski, 1929] was an isolated paper in Tarski’s production, and this both
by comparison with Tarski’s published oeuvre in the years 1924–1929, and
with the work on geometry that Tarski was developing during his courses
at Warsaw University in 1926–1927 ([Szczerba, 1986], p. 908) as we know it
from his later writings and from contributions by others.
Tarski worked on the geometry of straight lines ([Tarski, 1935], p. 324
[64], fn 53) and gave an “axiomatic development of elementary Euclidean
geometry, the part of plane Euclidean geometry that is not based upon set-
theoretical notions, or, in other words, the part that can be developed within
the framework of ﬁrst-order logic.” ([Tarski and Givant, 1999], p. 175). The
axiom system in question, for 2-dimensional Euclidean point geometry with
21 axioms and three primitives (equality, betweenness and equidistance) is
given in [Tarski, 1967], p. 329 [see also especially §3, Notes 6, 21 and 34].
According to Szczerba,
The system that Tarski presented in this course [1926–1927] was
designed after Pieri [1908] (rather than Hilbert [1922]) and con-
tained a number of innovations. Only one universe was used, the
set of points, with two undeﬁned primitive relations: betweenness
and equidistance. ([Szczerba, 1986], p. 908)
So, Tarski’s work in geometry in 1926–1927 seems mainly to have been
in point geometry, and without the use of mereological notions. However
interesting we might ﬁnd these two diﬀerences with respect to [Tarski, 1929],
a remaining, third diﬀerence is most salient and interesting for our purposes
here.
When talking about his work in geometry, both Tarski himself and others,
including his students, stress one point again and again, namely that
Tarski strongly opposed the practice of formulating axioms with
the use of deﬁned notions. ([Szczerba, 1986], p. 908)]
The point is made also in a joint, posthumous paper:
Another distinctive feature of Tarski’s system is the formal sim-
plicity of the axioms upon which the development is based. As
opposed to Tarski’s system, in all the systems of geometry known
from the literature, at least some—and sometimes even most—
axioms are not formulated directly in terms of primitive notions,
but contain also other notions, previously deﬁned.
([Tarski and Givant, 1999], p. 192)
And about the system in [Tarski, 1959]:
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For Euclidean geometry he picks two predicates: the ternary pred-
icate B to denote the betweeness relation and the quarternary
predicate D to denote the equidistance relation. (. . . ) In this
language Tarski formulates a simple axiom system for plane Eu-
clidean geometry (. . . ) The axiom system consists only of twelve
short ﬁrst order ΠΣ sentences and the continuity axiom, in the
case of second order arithmetic, or the continuity axiom schema,
in case of the ﬁrst order (i.e., elementary) geometry; all axioms
are being formulated without the use of deﬁned terms, contrary
to the prevailing custom. [Footnote: Compare, for instance, The
Hilbert axiom system in [Grundlagen der Geometrie, Achte Auf-
lage, Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft, Stuttgart, 1956], full of deﬁned
terms, even of higher orders.] ([Szmielew, 1974], pp. 123–124)
We ﬁnd the same point made by Steve Givant:
Tarski was critical of Hilbert’s axiom system from a logical per-
spective; since deﬁned notions were used in formulating these
axioms, their true complexity was not evident. ([Givant, 1999],
p. 50)
These passages suggest that there was a “prevailing custom”, that of using
deﬁned notions in axioms, typical of Hilbert and Pieri, and also that Tarski
strongly opposed it, that this opposition was distinctive of Tarski’s attitude,
and that this attitude had amethodological advantage: namely, that avoiding
deﬁned notions in the axioms makes the system more perspicuous, while
using them masks the real complexity of the axiomatic structure.
Now, in contrast to the above, Tarski’s [Tarski, 1929] does have deﬁned
notions in the axioms. This is the third diﬀerence between this paper in the
geometry of solids and the rest of Tarski’s coeval work in geometry. If we
have to take seriously Tarski’s mainly methodological attitude as described
byGivant, Szczerba, Szmielewand Tarski himself, this is truly odd. Howcan
we explain this oddity? Before attempting to answer this question, we should
note here that the claim that Tarski’s mainly methodological attitude was
distinctive for his times is not very credible. On the contrary, that attitude
was common in theWarsawmilieuwhere Tarski studied. It was championed
by Tarski’s teachers Les´niewski and Łukasiewicz, and is especially evident
in Les´niewski’s practice where it is applied at its strictest. Tarski inherited
this attitude, so to speak, and learned to master the technique while working
under Les´niewski’s supervision to the construction of Les´niewski’s systems
(see e.g., Tarski’s PhD thesis [Tarski, 1923]).
Les´niewski writes:
From a standpoint of correctness, in a given system, deﬁnitions
should always follow the axioms. ([Les´niewski, 1988a], p. 92)
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The strict order in which axioms and deﬁnitions should thus appear in a sys-
temaccording toLes´niewski—the axiomsﬁrst—forces the axioms touse only
primitive notions (and deﬁned notions from other systems). Sobocin´ski,
who attributes the requirement to Łukasiewicz puts the issue as follows:
This requirementwas ﬁrst brought intoprominence byŁukasiewicz.
It was accepted without reservation by Les´niewski. It stipulates
that no deﬁned term should be used for the purpose of formulating
the axiom system. Deﬁnitions can be introduced into the theory
only after the axiom system has been stated in full (. . . ) It follows
from the requirement under discussion that a well constructed ax-
iom system should be formulated with the aid of primitive terms
of the theory (. . . ) Both Łukasiewicz and Les´niewski attached
great signiﬁcance to the present requirement although it is often
disregarded by various authors (. . . ) The clarity which we achieve
by using deﬁned terms for the purpose of formulating axiom sys-
tems, is deceptive. In fact it only conceals the proper structure of
the axioms, which may lead to misunderstandings since in such
cases we add deﬁnitions not to the whole system, but to its part.
In Les´niewski’s theories the exclusiveness of the primitive terms is
secured by the rules of procedure. ([Sobocin´ski, 1956], pp. 57–58)
Also, according to Sobocin´ski the length of an axiom system, for example,
should be minimised for the system to be as simple as possible, primitive
terms should be mutually independent and their number should be minimal.
These ideals play a role also in other work by Tarski. An example is provided
in [Tarski and Givant, 1999]:
If we consider systems of full geometry which are based upon ﬁnite
axiom sets, we can use as measure of simplicity the most obvious
criterion, namely the total length of the axiom set, i.e., the sum of
the lengths of all its particular axioms. ([Tarski andGivant, 1999],
p. 192)
So Tarski’s apparent revulsion against the use of deﬁned notions in axioms
did not fall out of thin air. With Tarski’s Les´niewskian background in mind,
we can understand where his dislike came from. From this perspective it
seems much more remarkable that in [Tarski, 1929] Tarski did not pursue
these ideals in practice, and, as we will see later, used deﬁned notions in
axioms himself. On top of that, in [Tarski, 1956a] Tarski proposes to take
an additional notion as primitive, which consequently renders the primitive
terms interdeﬁnable.
§3. The foundations of the geometry of solids. We have seen that, by his
own admission, Tarski developed the geometry of solids on a mereologi-
cal basis following a problem raised by Les´niewski. As to Mereology as a
deductive basis for the geometry of solids: we know that the development
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of Mereology had for Les´niewski a philosophical, and in particular an on-
tological motivation. Mereology is a theory of collective classes which, in
opposition to set theory as a theory of distributive classes, does not involve
dubious abstract entities such as empty sets. The development of geometry
as the geometry of solids had a similar philosophical motivation. The ge-
ometry of solids construes geometry as a theory of some relations among
observables and eschews points as ideal objects.
Jas´kowski is very clear on the aim of developing a geometry of solids. It
was to eliminate the abstract, ideal terms from geometry:
The reasons that contributed to the development of the geometry
of solids were philosophical: the main goal was to reduce the
abstract, ideal terms of geometry in the language of empirical
observations. ([Jas´kowski, 1948], p. 298)
or to avoid the assumption of ideal objects:
The philosophy of solids possesses a philosophical aspect. Eu-
clidean point geometry was connected to the Greek idealist phi-
losophy. The fact that each object that is accessible to the human
senses has a non-zero volume, did not prevent the believe that
there exist objects without volume. In the axioms of the geometry
of solids one does not postulate this type of ideal objects any more.
([Jas´kowski, 1949], p. 77)
Concretely, this means that
[a]ll primitive terms of zero-volume, like points, segments, planes
etc., were eliminated. Because all primitive terms were solids or
relations between solids this method has been called geometry of
solids. ([Jas´kowski, 1949], p. 77)
Before Tarski, the geometry of solids had been studied by Huntington
[Huntington, 1913] and gained recognition through Whitehead’s Theory
of Events [Whitehead, 1919, 1920], and—contrary to what is suggested by
[Bostock, 2009]: 47)—the geometry of solids is in some form still in use
today [Coquand, 1991], [Lubarsky, 2010].
“Theory of Events” seems like a strange name for the geometry of solids,
but once we realise that in Whitehead’s theory events are spatiotemporal
regions the name no longer seems so strange.5
Althoughhedidnot himself build aproper systemof the geometry of solids
comparable to his other three deductive systems (Protothetic, Ontology and
Mereology), Les´niewski also got involved with the geometry of solids to
5Whitehead’s work, which was already known to Russell in 1914 but published only
later, was immediately picked up in [Russell, 1914] (cf. preface), discussed by de Laguna
[de Laguna, 1922] (who has solids and prompted Whitehead’s successive version of the
theory) and by Nicod [Nicod, 1923] (who has volumes). The ﬁrst edition of [Russell, 1914]
has only a generic reference to Whitehead, while later, revised editions carry references to
[Whitehead, 1919, 1920] (many thanks to Gregory Landini for this information).
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some extent. He reports in a long footnote of [Les´niewski, 1928] that in 1926
Tarski had brought to his attention the relationship between Whitehead’s
theory of events and his Mereology:
In 1926 Tarski brought to my attention both the conception of
‘events’ developped in 1919 by Whitehead in his interesting book
An enquiry concerning the principles of natural knowledge, and its
relation with my ‘general class theory’ . . .
([Les´niewski, 1988a], p. 171)
Les´niewski also mentions that Tarski had conjectured that the axiomatic
foundation given byWhitehead of his theory of events was not “suﬃcient, as
an axiomatic foundation for the notion of ‘events’ whichWhitehead develops
in his work” ([Surma, Srzednicki, Barnett, and Rickey, 1991], p. 260, n. 84).
Les´niewski gives here only “tentative observations [ . . . ] which could be
considered as steps towards a solution of Tarski’s problem” (Ibid.)—and
which indeed conﬁrmTarski’s conjecture. Les´niewski’s cautiousness is due to
the fact thatWhitehead’s is not a formal theory of events (“Whiteheadmakes
no attempt to put his conception of ‘events’ into the form of a deductive
theory [ . . . ]” (Ibid.)) so that it remained diﬃcult to understand how
certain formulations had to be interpreted. A more extended treatment of
Whitehead’s theory along these lines is contained in [Les´niewski, 1988b]:
171–178. Although this piece is not dated by the editors, it cannot have
been written before 1927 as it quotes Russell’s “Analysis of Matter” which
appeared in that year.
So in 1926 Tarski and Les´niewski were, if not exactly working together
on the geometry of solids, at least looking at problems related to systems of
the geometry of solids at the same time. In 1927, Tarski gives the talk later
published as [Tarski, 1929].
In the light of the above, [Tarski, 1929] has, prima facie, a rather strong
Les´niewskian appearance. Could we guess that if Les´niewski had built a
system of the geometry of solids, it would have looked more or less like
Tarski’s? No. As we shall see in the remainder of this paper, except for the
use of mereological notions, that wouldn’t be a correct guess.6 Two crucial
aspects of diﬀerence are the underlying logic used by Tarski and the method-
ology of the axiomatic construction of the system, both non-Les´niewskian.
We shall go deeper into these aspects in Sections 4 and 5 below.
6Therefore, we disagreee with Luschei, who goes so far as to group together Les´niewski’s
and Tarski’s systems of geometry as both building upon Mereology:
Mereology is too general to be counted a geometrical theory but (if mereological
ingredience is interpreted spatiotemporally) may be taken, together with the
underlying logic and grammar of protothetic and ontology, as basis for systems
of geometry proper . . . such as those constructed by Les´niewski and Tarski;
(Luschei 1962: 150).
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In the remainder of this sectionwewill discuss a speciﬁc aspect of diﬀerence
between Tarski’s conception and construction of the geometry of solids and
Mereology. As we have seen, Tarski had a particular take on the geometry
solids.
the speciﬁc character of such a geometry of solids—in contrast to
each “point” geometry—is shown in particular in the law accord-
ing to which each ﬁgure contains another ﬁgure as a proper part.
([Tarski, 1929] in [Givant and Mackenzie, 1986a], p. 227) (our
translation)
In other words: For Tarski a geometry of solids is atomless. How would
Les´niewski have thought about this?
Les´niewski’s Mereology is a theory of parts and wholes in general: no
presupposition of what exactly these parts and wholes are is built in the
system, whether they are concrete, and also in particular whether there are
atoms: as Sobocin´ski remarks in [Sobocin´ski, 1971], Les´niewski’sMereology
is neither atomistic nor atomless: no thesis can be proved to either eﬀect from
the axioms of Mereology (see also [Les´niewski, 1988b], p. 172). Now, how
about the system of the geometry of solids that one could base on it? Would
a Les´niewskian geometry of solids be atomless or atomistic? Although we
have no textual support for Les´niewski’s position, neither point of view seems
to be a necessary part of the philosophical idea behind the geometry of solids
as explained, for example, by Jas´kowski. The fact that Les´niewski in [Surma,
Srzednicki, Barnett, and Rickey, 1991], p. 260 n. 84 takes steps towards the
formalisation of an atomless geometry of solids does not count as evidence
against what we have just said, since here Les´niewski is not putting forward
his own system of the geometry of solids, but merely and explicitly trying to
shed light on Whitehead’s, which happens to be atomless.
By contrast, as we have seen, Tarski’s speciﬁc characterisation of the
geometry of solids clearly corresponds to an atomless point of view. Tarski
does not express that this conceptionmaypossibly diﬀer fromhis own views.7
Whitehead put the requirement of being atomless as follows:
Every event extends over other events and is itself part of other
events. ([Whitehead, 1919], p. 101)
Note that Whitehead speaks of events where Tarski speaks of ﬁgures.
In Les´niewski’s attempt at a formalisation of Whitehead the ﬁrst part of
this statement becomes:
2a. [a] : aevent. ⊃ .[∃c].cevent.ccz(a).8
([Les´niewski, 1988a], p. 172)
7See footnote 14 where we show that the atomless status of Tarski’s geometry of solids
follows from Tarski’s Axiom I.
8The term “cz” stands for the relation of being a part of.
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So Whitehead’s theory was atomless,9 and so was Les´niewski’s formalisa-
tion, and Tarski’s foundations. This was not, however, the only path that
was taken in that period.
Huntington’s geometry of solids [Huntington, 1913] is atomistic. He
deﬁnes a point as “any sphere which contains no other sphere within it”
([Huntington, 1913], p. 529), and continues as follows:
It may be noticed that there is nothing in this deﬁnition, or in any
of our work, which requires our ‘points’ to be small; for example,
a perfectly good geometry is presented by the class of all ordinary
spheres whose diameters are not less than one inch; the ‘points’
of this system are simply the inch-spheres. ([Huntington, 1913],
pp. 529–530)
We will see later that Tarski, who also deﬁned points, did so in a diﬀerent
way, and in a way that remains fully within Whitehead-style geometry of
solids.
Wemight conclude that Tarski has added the characterisation of the geom-
etry of solids as atomless to distinguish his Whiteheadian-style foundations
fromHuntington’s. He was aware of Huntington’s paper, which Tarski, con-
sistent with his characterisation, regards as point geometry ([Tarski, 1929],
p. 228) despite the fact that Huntington has spheres as primitives—and
needed to clarify the diﬀerence in approach. The connection with White-
head is visible on two other accounts. On the last page of the paper Tarski
says that the procedure he uses to deﬁne point and equidistance and which
enables him to ﬁx Axiom 1 as we shall see below, is a special case of White-
head’s so-called method of extensive abstraction. But he also names as a
new result of the paper
the precise method of establishing the mathematical foundations
of the geometry of solids, with the help of a categorical axiom
9[Simons, 1987], p. 42 seems to imply that the atomless point of view is natural in light of
the problem of continuum since Aristotle (he refers to [Whitehead, 1919], [Whitehead, 1920],
[Whitehead, 1929], [Russell, 1914], [de Laguna, 1922] and [Nicod, 1923]). However, one can
maintain that the question of whether the world is atomless or atomistic should be decided by
the world, not by an a priori theory (see e.g., [Newman, 1928], a critique of Russell’sAnalysis
of matter (1927), discussed in [Demopoulos and Friedman, 1985]). Les´niewski would have
agreed. He built his deductive theories in such a way to avoid presupposing any particular
way in which the world has to look like for those theories to hold. This is one reason why we
think that Les´niewski’s geometry of solids would have been, like Mereology, neither atomless
nor atomistic—for the same reason why Mereology is neither. A theorem like 2a. could
hold in a Les´niewskian geometry of solids in two ways. (1) we ﬁrst obtain a system of
atomless Mereology, then we build the geometry of solids on this basis by ﬁrst (i) adding the
primitive term “event” (possibly in an axiom) then (ii) stating a theorem equiform to 2a by
appropriately substituting ‘event’ to bound variables in a theorem of Mereology (following
the substitution rule). (2) We add an axiom to the geometry of solids from which that
theorem follows. Tarski does (2), see p. 14. Neither seems desirable from a Les´niewskian
point of view.
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system containing only one additional primitive notion: the no-
tion of sphere. ([Tarski, 1929] in [Givant and Mackenzie, 1986a],
p. 231)
Tarski’s paper seems indeed to have improvedWhitehead’s theory of events
along the lines of one concern raised by Les´niewski: making the foundations
more precise.
§4. Tarski’s axiomatisation. Tarski wrote [Tarski, 1929] in the style of
the working mathematician: informal but precise. This makes it hard to
recognise which system should be seen as the background logic for this paper.
AlthoughTarski says that he presupposes Les´niewski’sMereology, even from
the notions he uses it becomes clear that matters are not so straightforward.
In fact, it becomes apparent that Tarski does not only borrow ideas from
Les´niewski’s system, but also from the system of Whitehead and Russell’s
Principia mathematica. Later we will see that this observation has crucial
implications. Furthermore Tarski uses topological notions that he takes
from Kuratowski ([Kuratowski, 1922]), such as regular open and regular
closed sets. Kuratowski’s approach, however, does not directly ﬁt either of
these systems. Let’s now turn to the mathematical content of Tarski’s work.
Tarski starts out from the mereological notions being a part of and sum.
Being a part of is taken to be a primitive notion (of Les´niewski’sMereology),
but sum (collection) is not. Only in the 1956 edition does Tarski give the
deﬁnitions of sum and other deﬁned notions of Mereology, giving also its
axioms. These were supposed to be known in 1929, so this may be a reason
whyhedoes not give them in the earlier edition. Itmayalsobe that he omitted
them for other reasons. However, the formulation of the deﬁnitions and
axioms of Les´niewski’s Mereology shows particularly well—paradoxically
enough—the important role that Russell’s system plays here with the respect
to the issue of the background logic of Tarski’s paper. We will go deeper into
this in Section 5.
Apart from being a part of, Tarski takes sphere as the only primitive notion
speciﬁc to the geometry of solids. This suﬃces to deﬁne other geometrical
notions. The deﬁnitions come in this order: ﬁrst Tarski gives the deﬁ-
nitions of being externally tangent (Deﬁnition 1), being internally tangent
(Deﬁnition 2), being externally diametrical (Deﬁnition 3), being internally
diametrical (Deﬁnition 4), being concentric (Deﬁnition 5), point (Deﬁni-
tion 6), equidistant (Deﬁnition 7), solid (Deﬁnition 8), and being a point
interior to a solid (Deﬁnition 9). The deﬁnitions of point and solid read as
follows:
Definition 6. Point is the class of all spheres that are concentric with
an arbitrary sphere. ([Tarski, 1929] in [Givant and Mackenzie,
1986a], p. 229)
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Definition 8. Solid is an arbitrary sum of spheres. ([Tarski, 1929]
in [Givant and Mackenzie, 1986a], p. 229)
We shall leave the issue of the competitive formal systems for the next
section (which is connected with the use of ‘class’ in Deﬁnition 6 and ‘sum’
in Deﬁnition 8), but at least the following should be noted here. One might
think that Tarski’s notion of point repudiates the idea behind the geometry
of solids. However, contrary to Huntington, who took points to be minimal
spheres, Tarski deﬁnes them as a whole class of spheres. This deﬁnition is
in line with the idea behind the geometry of solids: a point is not seen as
an ideal object with zero volume, as would be the intersection of all spheres
that are concentric with an arbitrary sphere would be. Yet it must be said
that the extent to which a deﬁnition of this sort can be said to be really
successful in this respect depends on what classes are taken to be: if they
are themselves ideal objects, then the project is still problematic. If classes
are instead conceived as concrete objects, as Les´niewski’s mereological sums
are, then the project can succeed.10 We come back to the diﬀerences between
‘class’ and ‘sum’ in the following section.
After the deﬁnitions, Tarski merely mentions that because it is well known
that all notions of “normal” geometry can be deﬁned by those of point and
being equidistant of two points to another, all other notions of “point geom-
etry” can now also be introduced, like, especially, being a regular open set,
but, Tarski says, “I dispense here with the explicit statement of the deﬁnition
in question” ([Tarski, 1929], p. 230). And here he refers to Kuratowski’s
work [Kuratowski, 1922].
This seems a little too fast. The deﬁnition that Kuratowski gives is not in
terms of points and equidistance, but in the language of abstract topology.11
So it still needs to be explained howKuratowski’s deﬁnition can be expressed
in terms of point and equidistance, and consequently in terms of sphere and
being a part of.
Subsequently the axioms follow, which are just four in total. Contrary to
Tarski’s motivation for other research in geometry, and contrary to his own
dislike for the use of deﬁned notions in axioms, we will see that this is exactly
what he uses here.
10“[A]lthoughwe perceive solids, we perceive no abstractive sets of solids [ . . . ] In accepting
the abstractive set, we are as veritably going beyond experience as in accepting the solid of
zero-length.” ([de Laguna, 1922], p. 460). Cf. also the discussion in section 2.2 (Eliminativist
theories) of [Varzi, 2008].
11We shall say that A is a regular open set, when
A = A−1−1.
([Kuratowski, 1922], p. 194)
In other words: A is a regular open set when it is identical to the complement of the closure
of the complement of its closure.
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Axiom 1. The notions of point and equidistance of two points to
a third satisfy all axioms of ordinary Euclidean geometry of three
dimensions. [Footnote: An axiom system of ordinary geometry
that contains these notions as the only primitive notions has been
put forth by Pieri in his aforementioned work.12] ([Tarski, 1929]
in [Givant and Mackenzie, 1986a] p. 230)
We want to note two things about this axiom. Firstly, the axiom is somewhat
puzzling because to the modern reader the notion of satisfaction gives it a
(what we would now call) metamathematical ﬂavour.13
Secondly, from this axiom it follows that Tarski’s geometry is indeed atom-
less: It is a result of Pieri’s axiomatisation, mentioned in Tarski’s Axiom 1,
that every sphere contains another sphere as a proper part.14 And because
every solid holds a sphere as a part (by the deﬁnition of solid and sum),
and because that sphere has another sphere as a proper part, it also fol-
lows that every solid holds another ﬁgure as a proper part (by transitivity
of the relation of being a part). In other words: Tarski’s axiomatisation
founds indeed a geometry of solids according to his own deﬁnition of the
ﬁeld.
The remaining three axioms, the aim of which is to make the system
categorical, combine what Tarski calls notions of the geometry of solids
(solid and being part of) and notions of ordinary point geometry, which are
in fact notions of topology (regular open set and inclusion):
12The “aforementioned work” is Pieri’s point and sphere memoire [Pieri, 1908].
13One should however keep in mind that Tarski’s notion of “satisfaction” (and connected
to that the notion of “model”) diﬀers considerably from the meaning that we attach to it
nowadays:
Let’s imagine that in the axioms and theorems of the constructed science the
primitive terms have been replaced everywhere by corresponding variables (to
avoid making our considerations more complicated we leave aside the theorems
containing deﬁned terms). The laws of the science have ceased to be proposi-
tions and are nowwhat have been called inmodern logic propositional functions:
expressions with the grammatical form of propositions, and that become propo-
sitions when one replaces the appearing variables by suitable constant terms.
Considering such and such other objects, we can examine whether they satisfy
the so-obtained axiom system, that is to say whether the names of these objects,
put in place of the variables, make these axioms true propositions; if it turns out
that this is the case, we say that such objects form a model of the axiom system
under consideration. ([Tarski, 1937], pp. 331–332, own translation)
This shows how in Tarski’s view one axiom system can be a model for another one. A
thorough discussion would go beyond the scope of this paper.
14Sketch: We say that a sphere through D with centre B is a part of a sphere through C
with centre A , if there exists a point on the sphere through B with centre A that lies on AC ;
we say that it is a proper part when this point does not coincide with C . Let S be a sphere
through X with centre Y . Then, by Postulate XII a midpoint M of X and Y exists. Then
also a sphere throughM with centre Y exists. This sphere is a proper part of the former.
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Axiom 2. If A is a solid, the class a of all points interior of A is a
regular open set.
Axiom 3. If the class a of points is a regular open set, there exists
a solid A such that a is the class of all interior points.
Contrary to Szczerba’s statement ([Szczerba, 1986], p. 911) that Tarski has
intended his spheres to correspond to open (Euclidean) balls, or to what we
ﬁnd in [Aiello, Pratt-Hartmann, and Benthem, 2007] (p. 4) that the solids are
regular closed sets inR3 (from which we can deduce that spheres correspond
to closed Euclidean balls), it seems that Tarski, as he also explains, left open
the possibility of interpreting solids as either regular open or regular closed
sets throughout, meaning that the spheres can correspond to either open or
closed balls respectively.
Then the last axiom reads:
Axiom 4. For solids A and B : if all interior points of A are interior
points of B , then A is a part of B . ([Tarski, 1929] in [Givant and
Mackenzie, 1986a], p. 230)
Then he gives two alternatives of Axiom 4 as an example of how he expects
that the axiom system can be simpliﬁed by using intrinsic properties of the
geometry of solids (like being a part of)
Axiom 4′. If A is a solid and B is a part of A, then B is also a solid.
([Tarski, 1929] in [Givant and Mackenzie, 1986a], p. 230)
Axiom 4′′. If A is a sphere and B is a part of A, then there exists
a sphere C that is a part of B . ([Tarski, 1929] in [Givant and
Mackenzie, 1986a] p. 230)
Finally Tarski mentions that the given axiom system is categorical and that
it is equiconsistent with ordinary three dimensional Euclidean geometry. We
will not go into these issues here.
§5. The role of Russell’s system. We have seen that Tarski’s foundations
of the geometry of solids, although apparently based on Les´niewski’s Mere-
ology, contrary to the original non-committal spirit of the latter, is atomless,
and contrary to the general methodological convictions of Les´niewski (and
apparently also Tarski’s own), admits of deﬁned notions in axioms. How-
ever, one might think that, barring these deviations, Tarski is still working
inside a Les´niewskian framework insofar as he still works with notions from
Mereology; besides, Tarski might still presuppose a Les´niewskian back-
ground logic. That the background logic might be Les´niewskian is suggested
for instance by the use of subject-predicate form of axioms and deﬁnitions
“A is b”), as we ﬁnd in Les´niewski’s Ontology (roughly, Les´niewski’s pred-
icate logic, which in turn presupposes Protothetics, roughly, Les´niewski’s
propositional logic).
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We will argue in this section that the background logic of Tarski’s paper is
not Les´niewski’s Ontology, but that this role is played at least in part by the
logic of the Principia. We will consider the role which that idea taken from
Russell’s system plays in the 1929 edition of Tarski’s paper, but note that the
signiﬁcance of the role played by those ideas becomes even more clear when
we consider the 1956 edition. It is crucial—as we will see—to assign that
system a role in the background logic of Tarski’s paper, both to explain the
1956 additions and to clarify the mathematical content of the paper.
Our main idea is that, to make sense of the paper, we have to distinguish
three ways in which the domain of discourse—i.e.: the “things” that a theory
is about—can technically get embodied in a mathematical or formal theory.
The ﬁrst of these three ways is by appealing to the notion of the range of the
quantiﬁers, the second by appealing to a “special” primitive notion in the
language of the theory, and the third by specifying a set of individuals akin
to objects of the ﬁrst type in Russell’s simple type theory.
In making this distinction we are inﬂuenced by Mancosu ([Mancosu,
2006]) who also diﬀerentiates between the range of the quantiﬁers and the
domain of discourse. We will come back to Mancosu’s distinction at the end
of this section. However, for now it is important to note that by contrast to
what we do, when Mancosu distinguishes these notions, he is not speaking
about two diﬀerent levels, namely a formal one embodied in the theory and
an informal one that needs to be codiﬁed into the theory. The domain of
discourse is for him already codiﬁed into the theory. Mancosu oﬀers in
his papers examples of Tarskian theories in which these formal constructs
relate in various ways to each other. We shall just note here that the exact
way in which domain of discourse (be it speciﬁed by a primitive notion
in the language or not), range of the quantiﬁers and individuals relate in
the practice of a working mathematician in Tarski’s time depends on the
background logical theory. Yet saying anything deﬁnite on the background
logic of a sketchy paper like this one, in which notions from concurrent
type-theoretical deductive frameworks (Principia and Les´niewski’s systems)
are mixed up with topology is no straightforward task. This scenario is of
such conceptual complexity that we feel that particular care must be used in
approaching the issue.
Let’s start with the 1929 edition, or rather with a summary Tarski made
of it about a year later (so 1930; our estimation). It contains the following
passage:
By ,,geometry of solids” we mean a geometrical system in which
the points, lines, planes do not occur as individuals (things of the
1st type) at all, and in which every spatial ﬁgure contains another
spatial ﬁgure as a proper part. ([Tarski, 1930])15
15This appears to be a draft for the biography included in [Ajdukiewicz et al., 1935], but
diﬀers considerably from it.
ON TARSKI’S FOUNDATIONS OF THE GEOMETRY OF SOLIDS 247
Les´niewski’s systems use a theory of simple linguistic types: if Tarski’s
background logic had been Les´niewskian, Tarski would have taken the
‘points’, the ‘lines’ and the ‘planes’ in the quote as expressions, not as things,
and those expressions would be typed only according to their linguistic cate-
gory. Tarski seems instead to draw type-theoretical notions from a simpliﬁed
version of the logic of Principia (this is also conﬁrmed by [Lejewski, 1983],
p. 64) to which extralogical notions from Mereology are added and whose
(adapted) axioms are here taken for granted. This whole forms the basis of
the geometry of solids.
As Mancosu has noted ([Mancosu, 2006], p. 217) the background logic
often used by Tarski is a simple theory of types. Since Les´niewski’s logic
includes a theory of simple types, one might think that Tarski is working
within a Les´niewskian logic. But that’s not the case: in the paper Tarski uses
a Russellian notion of class, and—as we just saw—a Russellian conception
of (objectual) types.
The interplay of mereological Les´niewskian notions and Russellian type
theory shows also particularly well in Deﬁnitions 6 and 8 (which we saw in
Section 3, and we now display again, this time with Tarski’s footnotes):
Definition 6. Point is the class of all spheres that are concentric
with an arbitrary sphere. [Footnote: I use here everywhere the
term “class” in a very diﬀerent sense than the one adopted by
Les´niewski in his aforementioned system and more conform the
one of Principia mathematica (Vol. I, 2nd edition, Cambridge
1925) byWhitehead andRussel [sic]. The spheres (resp. the solids)
have thus been treated here as individuals, that is as objects of the
lowest rank, while the points, as class of these spheres, are objects
of a higher rank (the second rank)]. ([Tarski, 1929] in [Givant
and Mackenzie, 1986a], p. 229)
Definition 8. Solid is an arbitrary sum of spheres. [Footnote: The
term ,,sum” coincides herewith ,,collection” inLes´niewski’sMere-
ology.] ([Tarski, 1929] in [Givant and Mackenzie, 1986a], p. 229)
First it can be noted that, in a Russellian way of reading Deﬁnition 6,
points are not things of the ﬁrst type. So indeed Tarski stays here within
the ﬁeld of the geometry of solids, according to his own deﬁnition of the
latter—as we just saw in the 1930 passage quoted above. Apart from the
fact that his requirement that every ﬁgure contains a ﬁgure as a proper part
prevented him from doing this, Tarski could not have adopted a deﬁnition
of point a` la Huntington (i.e., points as minimal spheres), because points
would then, like spheres, be things of the ﬁrst type.
In Deﬁnition 8 the interplay of the Russellian type-theoretical basis and
the mereological notion of sum and topology gets really interesting and
complicated, because it necessitates, as we will argue, an acceptance of
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Russellian-like individuals as a way for Tarski to restrict the scope of a
statement or deﬁnition. Here the precise deﬁnition of sum is important.
This is given as part of the full axiom system ofMereology which is present
only in the 1956 edition of the paper ([Tarski, 1956a]), which reads as follows.
Definition I. An individual X is called a proper part of an individ-
ual Y if X is a part of Y and X is not identical with Y .
Definition II. An individual X is said to be disjoint from an indi-
vidual Y if no individual Z is part of both X and Y .
Definition III. An individual X is called a sum of all elements of
a class α of individuals if every element of α is a part of X and if no
part of X is disjoint from all elements of α. ([Tarski, 1956a], p. 25)
Postulate I. If X is a part of Y and Y is a part of Z, then X is a
part of Z.
Postulate II. For every non-empty class α of individuals there ex-
ists exactly one individual X which is the sum of all elements of α.16
([Tarski, 1956a], p. 25)
In Tarski’s formulation of this axiom system of mereology we can again
observe several non-Les´niewskian elements. First, just as Tarski had done
with the axiom system for the geometry of solids in the 1929 edition, the
postulates follow the deﬁnitions and one of the postulates even uses a de-
ﬁned notion.17 Second, Tarski speaks of a “non-empty class”, whereas for
Les´niewski collections are always non-empty. So supposing then that Tarski
was working against a Les´niewskian background logic, this remark would
have been superﬂuous. Third and most importantly for our purposes, the
term “individual” appears several times. Wewill argue below that this should
be understood in Russellian terms.
16Note that there is a change from the use of “Axiom” in [Tarski, 1929] to the use of
“Postulate” in article II of [Tarski, 1956b]. From a letter from Montague, representing
Tarski, to Woodger in 1954, it is clear that this change was not initiated nor approved by
Tarski:
We cannot understand why, in this article, German ‘Axiom’ has been translated
by ‘Postulate’ while, in later articles, the term ‘Axiom’ is everywhere used. This is
especially unfortunate since ‘Postulates’ in article II are real axioms—statements
accepted as truewithout proof—andnot postulates characterizing a formal system.
(Montague to Woodger, March 9, 1954, Woodger papers: C [Correspondence],
Special Collections Library, University College London)
The fact that Montague speaks of the German word “Axiom” may be a confusion. We are
not aware of a German version of [Tarski, 1929].
17Les´niewski himself has formulated axioms of Mereology using deﬁned notions on at
least two occasions ([Les´niewski, 1988a], p. 60; [Les´niewski, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931],
p. 232) in his later career. He has justiﬁed this by referring to chronological or historical
accuracy, and stated in these cases either that this had troubled him ([Les´niewski, 1927, 1928,
1929, 1930, 1931], p. 315) or that it was not correct ([Les´niewski, 1988a], p. 92).
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We will return now to the problem of how to interpret sum (and as a conse-
quence of how to interpret “individual”), but within a broader argument and
as part of a bigger problem. This consists of ﬁrst establishing the range of
the quantiﬁers for Tarski’s foundations, that we have discussed in Section 4.
There are only three possibilities for this: either it consists of less than the
class of all solids (like the class of all spheres), or it consists precisely of the
class of all solids, or it consists of more than just solids. Before explaining
this, let us ﬁrst remark that we will show that the last option is entangled
with the proper interpretation of ‘sum’, and with the use of the Russellian
term ‘individuals’ in its deﬁnition.
So what is the range of the quantiﬁers for Tarski’s foundations? What are
the intended values of the variables? Let us ﬁrst consider the possibility that
the range of the quantiﬁers consists of the class of all spheres, so the objects
that are singled out by the primitive notion as well. However, because the
class of spheres is not closed under summation, i.e., the class of spheres is
strictly smaller than the class of solids in this strong interpretation, it would
not make sense to have a predicate for solids in this case. This suﬃces to
exclude the possibility that the range of the quantiﬁers is less than the class
of all solids in Tarski’s foundations.
Can the range of the quantiﬁers be the class of solids? In [Gruszczyn´ski
and Pietruszczak, 2008] we ﬁnd the following appealing argument against
this. Reconsider Axiom 4′:
Axiom 4′. If A is a solid and B is a part of A, then B is also a solid.
([Tarski, 1929] in [Givant and Mackenzie, 1986a], p. 230)
When we take the range of the quantiﬁers to be the class of all solids, the
conclusion that B is also a solid would be the case even without stating
it in an axiom, and this whole axiom (not just the requirement that A be
a solid) could be omitted. So having the range of the quantiﬁers be the
class of all solids would make some of the axioms trivial, Gruszczyn´ski
and Pietruszczak argue ([Gruszczyn´ski and Pietruszczak, 2008], p. 483).
And this is something that Tarski—so one might conjecture—could not
have meant to happen. (Note that having superﬂuous axioms would not be
very Les´niewskian either.) We are not going to settle the issue of whether
Gruszczyn´ski and Pietruszczak’s triviality point is right here. What we
cannot exclude is that Tarski was simply non-committal on this issue, and
so we conclude the following: the range of the quantiﬁers contains the class
of all solids, but its exact extension is unspeciﬁed.
Having narrowed down in this way the possibilities that the range of
quantiﬁers could be taken to be, we now come back to the deﬁnition of sum:
Definition III. An individual X is called a sum of all elements of
a class α of individuals if every element of α is a part of X and if no
part of X is disjoint from all elements of α. ([Tarski, 1956a], p. 25)
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Let us assume for a moment that “individuals” are the objects that the
quantiﬁers range over. We will argue that this will lead to problems.
First note that a range of quantiﬁers that contains solids, but the precise
extent of which remains unspeciﬁed, will not do here. What object is consid-
ered to be the sum depends onwhat objects exactly wemay chose from. If we
assume that X may be chosen out of some strictly larger set than just solids,
then for sum we have to pick a diﬀerent object than if we had restricted our
choice to solids only; see also footnote 18. So, leaving the precise extent of
the range of quantiﬁers unspeciﬁed would lead to a non-well-deﬁned notion
of sum.
Tarski says that the notion of sum he introduces is that of Les´niewski’s
Mereology, but Tarski’s use of topological notions complicates things. What
notion of sum is meant in this paper becomes more clear when we study
its relation to Axioms 2 and 3. These axioms establish a correspondence
between regular open sets and interior points of solids:
Axiom 2. If A is a solid, the class a of all points interior of A is a
regular open set.
Axiom 3. If the class a of points is a regular open set, there exists a
solid A such that a is the class of all interior points. ([Tarski, 1929]
in [Givant and Mackenzie, 1986a] p. 230)
If we take seriously Tarski’s intention to let solids correspond to regular open
or regular closed sets, it is important that the sumof arbitrary solids is a solid.
Or, in other words: that the class of solids is closed under summation as
introduced inDeﬁnition III. Were that not the case, then the correspondence
between the interior points of solids and regular open or regular closed sets
stated in Axiom 2 and 3 would be faulty, as the following example illustrates.
Wewill followTarski’s suggestion ([Tarski, 1956a], p. 29) to let spheres cor-
respond to the interiors of Euclidean spheres, and—deviating from Tarski,
who clearly avoids the problem we present below—the relation of parts and
whole as the inclusion relation between sets (and not, as Tarski does, as the
inclusion relation restricted to non-empty regular open sets ([Tarski, 1956a],
p. 29; a signiﬁcant pick.) Additionally, as not unlikely in the context of
Euclidean geometry, we take the range of the quantiﬁers to be the collection
of sets, which is strictly more than solids, or, to be more precise: more than
the interpretation of solids in Euclidean geometry.
As a simpliﬁcation—but not an oversimpliﬁcation—we explain the prob-
lem in the 1-dimensional case, instead of the 3-dimensional case. A 1-
dimensional “sphere” then corresponds to an open interval; a 1-dimensional
“solid” to an arbitrary sum of those. A similar argument to the argument
below can be given for the 3-dimensional case.
Note that the interval (0, 1) does not only correspond to a sphere, it is also
the class of all interior points of some 1-dimensional solid by Axiom 3 and
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the observation that (0, 1) is a regular open set—the interior of the closure
of (0, 1) is again (0, 1)—and hence corresponds to a solid in our setting.
Also the interval (1, 2) corresponds then, of course, to a solid. So what
would be the sum of solids (0, 1) and (1, 2)? Well, according to Deﬁnition
III in our current interpretation of individuals, we will have to look for some
object that contains as parts the solids corresponding to the intervals (0, 1)
and (1, 2), and of which no part is disjoint from these solids. In other words:
the smallest object that includes both the solids corresponding to (0, 1) and
(1, 2). The only candidate for this is the object corresponding to the union
of the intervals (0, 1) and (1, 2), i.e., (0, 1) ∪ (1, 2).
There is more that we can say about this object: by Deﬁnition 8 we know
it is a solid, and by Axiom 2 we ﬁnd that it is thus a regular open set. But is
it a regular open set? No.
Let’s verify that. The closure of (0, 1) ∪ (1, 2) is the closed interval [0, 2].
The interior of that is the open interval (0, 2) which is not equal to (0, 1) ∪
(1, 2).18 So we see that the sum of the two solids we started out with is not a
regular open set. This is not only a formal problemof the axiom system (since
what Tarski calls “regular open sets” would not be what is normally called
so), but moreover clashes with Tarski’s intention to let solids correspond to
regular open or closed sets. So if we assume—as we are currently doing—
that the class of individuals contains more than just solids (all sets, in this
case), the class of solids is not closed under summation.
From the above we conclude, to come back to Deﬁnition III, that the class
of individuals should be the class of solids: One cannot be non-committal
on its precise extension. Because, taking the class of individuals to be
unspeciﬁed to some extent—as we take the range of the quantiﬁers to be—
leads to the problem explained above, namely that the regular open (or,
respectively: closed) sets in Tarski’s theory do not correspond to what one
would normally call regular open (resp. closed) sets.
Tarski’s use of individuals is in line with Russell’s use of individuals in
simple type theory, because in that theory the individuals are the objects
of ﬁrst type—and this squares both with Tarski’s characterisation of the
geometry of solids in the 1930 passage and the footnote of Deﬁnition 6.
Note however that this use is not in line with Les´niewski’s systems, where
‘individuals’ in this sense have no place. Moreover, Les´niewski’s idea of
formal systems obeys a hierarchy ruled by generality constraints. If the
foundations of the geometry of solids were to be founded upon a system of
Mereology, then that system should be of a general, multiple-purpose sort,
and not one already geared towards the geometry of solids (i.e., with sum
deﬁned only on certain objects, i.e., on solids). By mentioning individuals
that are intended to correspond to solids already in the axiomatisation of
18So the smallest regular open set that includes (0, 1) and (1, 2) is (0, 2). So we see that the
precise object that is the sum of two solids depends on the set that we may chose X from.
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Mereology, the idea of that hierarchy—an axiomatic layer of the geometry
of solids upon a distinct axiomatic layer of Mereology as a more general
theory—is abandoned. Note, also, that like types, quantiﬁers in Les´niewski’s
systems are not objectual, and nominal variables cannot be said to ‘range’
over anything, let alone over a set of objects identical or bigger than a
collection of objects said ‘of the ﬁrst type’ called ‘individuals’. This said,
however, it remains diﬃcult to claim something deﬁnite as to the general
formal setup of Tarski’s paper, i.e., the ‘background logic’, for the paper
shows a mixture of elements in this sense.19
The ﬁndings on the range of the quantiﬁers that we have presented in
this section are inspired by Mancosu’s analysis in [Mancosu, 2006], but
diﬀer in the sense explained at the beginning of this section. To see where
exactly the diﬀerence lies, let us have a closer look Mancosu’s ideas. In 2006
Mancosu emphasises, in an argument against Gomez-Torrente, that Tarski
often works with theories in which the domain of discourse—i.e., what a
theory is about—is singled out by a primitive predicate and which allow for
the possibility of individuals falling outside the domain of discourse:
(. . . ) I will show that Tarski would reject that every mathemati-
cal theory he is considering must be inconsistent with the state-
ment that there are individuals that fall outside the ‘domain of
discourse’. (. . . ) I will provide evidence that Tarski and other
logicians of that time made a distinction between ‘range of the
quantiﬁers’ (or range of the signiﬁcance of the individual vari-
ables) and ‘domain of discourse’, that is they entertained theories
that, while presenting a predicate S for the ‘domain of discourse’,
either prove ∃x.¬S(x) or simply do not decide the issue either way.
([Mancosu, 2006], p. 220)20
19An anonymous referee has pointed out that our choice of keeping open the option of the
range of the quantiﬁers as being bigger than the individuals involved in the theory contrasts
with the Russellian setup of Tarski’s paper. For in the case of a Russellian setup, the range of
the ﬁrst-order variables is always identical to the individuals (and is either strictly larger than
the domain of discourse or identical to it; the latter case appearing only when the domain of
discourse is given by a single primitive predicate). In non-Russellian setups the range of the
quantiﬁers is strictly larger than the domain of discourse. If we were to take [Tarski, 1929]
to be undoubtedly Russellian, we could thus immediately conclude that in [Tarski, 1929] the
range of the quantiﬁers is identical to the class of individuals. As we have mentioned, how-
ever, the situation in this paper is complicated by the fact that Tarski is drawing from a variety
of theories, in particular the Russellian nature of [Tarski, 1929] is not immediately clear in the
presence of Les´niewski’s systems (see also [Lejewski, 1983]). Moreover, arguments have been
oﬀered that the range of the quantiﬁers cannot be identical to the class of individuals; see the
argument from triviality from [Gruszczyn´ski and Pietruszczak, 2008] wementioned earlier in
this section. By keeping open the option that the range of quantiﬁers contains more than in-
dividuals allows us to keep the most neutral interpretive stance with respect to [Tarski, 1929].
20Mancosumakes this distinction in the context of the discussion on Tarski’s conception of
model in 1936. He argues in favour of what he calls “the relative ﬁxed domain conception”.
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In these theories the domain of discourse consists of the objects a theory is
about and these are represented by a certain primitive notion in the theory
at hand. Note that this is not to say that there can be no other primitive
notions, just that there is one special one.
It is somewhat problematic to apply to Tarski’s foundations of the geome-
try of solids the idea that the domain of discourse is represented in a theory
by a primitive notion.21 For whereas Tarski’s theory is clearly about solids,
these do not get represented by a primitive notion. The objects that do get
represented by a primitive notion are spheres, which, when we close under
summation the objects falling under it, yield the domain of discourse (solids).
We will argue in the next section that exactly this discrepancy between the
domain of discourse and the primitive notion of the theory may explain a
passage that Tarski added to the 1956 edition.
Before we turn to that, let us explain the precise relation between Man-
cosu’s distinction on the one hand, and ours on the other. We follow Man-
cosu in the distinction between range of the quantiﬁers and domain of dis-
course. We wish to propose a distinction of levels between the pretheoretical,
non-technical idea of a domain of discourse of a science, and the speciﬁc,
technical ways in which that idea gets embodied in a (formal) theory. The
pre-theoretical idea of a domain of discourse is to be found atmany junctures
in history, starting from antiquity, whenever the problem of singling out the
proper ﬁeld or genus of a science is addressed.22 In modern times, this idea
has been codiﬁed in various technical ways. The range of the quantiﬁers is
just one of these speciﬁc, technical ways in which the idea of the domain of
discourse gets codiﬁed in a theory. The range of quantiﬁers is a notion that
has a direct, unique relation with a formal theory: it is the intended value
of the variables in a formal language. But there is not just one way in which
this speciﬁcation of the domain of the discourse takes place, or works in a
theory, nor even two. Nowadays the domain of discourse is often taken to
correspond to the range of the quantiﬁers. Mancosu stresses a secondway in
which the domain of discourse, to put it in our terms, got codiﬁed in a theory
in Tarski’s times: it often got reﬂected in the theory by a primitive notion
(and not by the range of the quantiﬁers). We take singling out a primitive
notion in the language and considering the collection of objects picked out by
that notion to be a second way to codify technically the domain of discourse
in a theory. We have seen that in the case of [Tarski, 1929], the pre-theoretical
idea of the domain of discourse is introduced into the formal theory in a
Exactly how the ﬁndings that we present in our current paper can be seen as additional
arguments for this conception will be part of future research.
21Note that Mancosu ([Mancosu, 2006]) discusses and is aware of the variety of systems
used by Tarski in his logical practice. Especially, he emphasises that there are theories in
which no single predicate is available to characterise the domain of discourse.
22On this see the ‘Domain Postulate’ of [Jong and Betti, 2010] and the discussion in
[Cantu`, 2010]
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third way: Russellian-like individuals. What is the domain of discourse of
the geometry of solids? Solids. These are, in [Tarski, 1929], the objects of
the ﬁrst Russellian type of the theory, the individuals. Acknowledging this
fact is fundamental to make sense of this paper.
§6. Universe of discourse. Mancosu’s “domain of discourse” comes very
close to a term Tarski himself uses in the passage that he added in the 1956
edition [Tarski, 1956a]: “universe of discourse”. Wewill see how this passage
connects to the fact that in [Tarski, 1929] the domain of discourse (solids)
does not get represented by a primitive notion (because the primitive notion
is here sphere), although that would have been more common in that period.
Tarski wrote:
It should be noticed that the class of all solids (and not the class
of all spheres) constitutes what is called the ‘universe of discourse’
for the geometry of solids. For this reason it may be convenient to
adopt the notion of solid as an additional primitive notion. In this
case Def. 8 should, of course, be omitted; in its place the fact that
the class of solids coincides with that of arbitrary sums should be
stated in a new postulate. ([Tarski, 1956a], p. 28)
Two parts of this passage call for explanation: ﬁrst, that solids are indicated
to be the universe of discourse; second, that spheres are denied to be the
universe of discourse. Both should be part of an explanation of what Tarski
had in mind here; i.e., of what “universe of discourse” means.
An explanation is oﬀered by [Gruszczyn´ski and Pietruszczak, 2008], but
we will argue that it goes wrong in failing to clarify why one should want to
deny that spheres are the universe of discourse. Moreover, their argument
does not take into account the distinction between range of the quantiﬁers
and domain of discourse that we have made in the previous section. This
leads them eventually to the conclusion that Tarski has made a mistake.
We will see later that by taking the distinction into account, we will be able
to put forward a more satisfying explanation of the passage above.
Let’s have a look at the argument of [Gruszczyn´ski and Pietruszczak,
2008]. First the authors try to establish the range of the quantiﬁers in
[Tarski, 1929], which they take as what Tarski means by universe of discourse
([Gruszczyn´ski and Pietruszczak, 2008], p. 482) and settle for (spatial) re-
gion.
Their strategy for arguing that the class of regions forms indeed the range of
the quantiﬁers is to show that the class of solids does notmake up the (whole)
range of the quantiﬁers. We have seen a similar argument in Section 5 (their
triviality argument). From this, however, they conclude that: “The above
examples seem to prove that the notion of region is present in Tarski’s theory,
although it is absent from Tarski’s paper” ([Gruszczyn´ski and Pietruszczak,
2008], p. 483). Now, we have agreed that the range of the quantiﬁers has
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an (unspeciﬁed) extension; to call this regions is innocent, but to claim, as
[Gruszczyn´ski and Pietruszczak, 2008] do, that there is some preconceived
notion of region that gets reﬂected in Tarski’s paper would require some
stronger argumentation.
Having taken “universe of discourse” to mean the range of the quantiﬁers,
they interpret Tarski’s later addition as follows:
Thus it seems that for Tarski the theory with Postulates 1–4 and
Deﬁnition 8 is equivalent to the theory in which: (a) all regions
are solids, (b) we take Postulates 1–4 together with:
() any region is the mereological sum of some set of balls.
([Gruszczyn´ski and Pietruszczak, 2008], p. 484)
Then the authors show that the equivalence between these two theories does
not hold. So it seems that Tarski must have made a mistake.
However, ﬁrst of all, it is not at all obvious that Tarski’s “universe of
discourse” should be interpreted as meaning the range of the quantiﬁers.
For one, this interpretation does not explain why Tarski points out that
the class of all spheres does not constitute the universe of discourse. No one
would have the false idea that spheresmake up the range of the quantiﬁers (as
we have also pointed out in Section 5), so it would be very strange for Tarski
explicitly to deny this. Second, [Gruszczyn´ski and Pietruszczak, 2008] does
not consider any other possibility, like interpreting “universe of discourse”
as domain of discourse, or as the class of individuals, or perhaps even as
something else entirely.
We say that Tarski’s “universe of discourse” should be interpreted as our
domain of discourse, namely the objects that a theory is about. We have
argued (with Mancosu) that logicians of Tarski’s time often represent these
objects by a primitive notion of the theory. The motivation for Tarski’s
remark above can then be clariﬁed by the discrepancy that we have here
between the domain of discourse (solids), and the lack of a primitive notion
for it (since the primitive here is sphere).
[Mancosu, 2006] argues that the domain of discourse in Tarski’s time was
often represented by a predicate symbol in the theory. Except by reference
to Tarski, Mancosu shows this by means of, for example, a text by Langford
[Langford, 1926] (see [Mancosu, 2006], p. 220). Assuming that this was
indeed common practice, a reader of [Tarski, 1929] may thus look for a
primitive notion and, ﬁnding sphere, conclude wrongly that the class of all
spheres makes up the domain of discourse, or at least may get somewhat
confused by the discrepancy here. This means that it would make sense to
deny spheres the role of domain of discourse, and at the same time, according
to common practice, to adopt solids as a primitive notion. The methodolog-
ical worry that the theory then contains two primitive notions whereas one
would suﬃce, was apparently of lesser concern to Tarski. This conﬁrms that
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Tarski is not concerned with any principal question of methodology in this
paper.
Moreover, this interpretation lifts the pivotal problem of [Gruszczyn´ski
and Pietruszczak, 2008]. Changing the range of the quantiﬁers would in-
deed be a major step, but to add another primitive notion is formally of
so little consequence that Tarski indeed could not have spent many more
words on it than he has actually done. What is left is only to spell out the
changes. Instead of Deﬁnition 8 the following axiom should be adopted,
call it Axiom 5:
Axiom 5. A solid is an arbitrary sum of spheres.
in which solid appears as a primitive notion. That is all.23
§7. Conclusion. From the above we conclude that although Tarski refers
to Les´niewski’s system in [Tarski, 1929], it can be argued that he was not
working in the spirit of the latter’s tradition. This is shown, for example, by
the fact that Tarski’s foundation of the geometry of solids is simply atomless
(instead of being neither atomless nor atomistic). More importantly, Tarski
uses deﬁned notions in axioms, a move which not only breaches his own
principles, but also conﬂicts with the mores in the Polish tradition. Finally,
Tarski’s use of Russellian notions is also clearly non-Les´niewskian. The
paper [Tarski, 1929] does not seem to obey any particular methodological
conviction. It shows instead a generally pragmatic attitude admitting a
variety of methods and tools, more typical of the practice of a working
mathematician than that of a philosopher.
The 1956 edition of this paper ([Tarski, 1956a]) reinforced this conclusion
not only by its introduction of evenmore axioms containing deﬁned notions,
but also by its proposed addition of solid as a primitive notion of the theory,
which wouldmake the set of primitive notions dependent, i.e., interdeﬁnable.
Scrutiny of the passage in which Tarski proposes this, together with the
newly added axioms of Mereology and the axioms of the geometry of solids,
necessitates a distinction between the range of the quantiﬁers, the (objects
falling under the) primitive terms, and the collection of individuals of a
theory. Only then can we make sense of the paper. The explicit recourse
to a collection of individuals making up the ﬁrst type in a Russellian type
theoretical framework in the 1956 edition shows evenmore clearly thatTarski
was not truly working in Les´niewski’s system.
The 1956 proposal itself, ﬁnally, to add solid as a primitive notion, can
be explained when one recalls that it was common in the beginning of the
20th century to represent the domain of discourse by a primitive notion
of the theory, and that using that was the way to restrict the scope of a
23Another motivation for Tarski’s addition of the passage above may be related to the
interconnectivity between [Tarski, 1956a] and [Tarski, 1956c] (on Boolean algebra). See
[Loeb, 2011].
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statement or deﬁnition, and not (as Tarski) by reference to the individuals
of a Russellian type theoretical framework. The change that he suggests
would have the eﬀect of identifying the extension of the primitive notion
solid and the collection of individuals, and thus of solving the problem.
Tarski’s suggestion does not need to be seen as motivated by methodologi-
cal worries (which even seems unlikely, given the other methodological issues
with this paper), but may simply stem from the desire not to be misunder-
stood, or may be intended to simplify further use or interpretation of this
theory.
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